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ARTICLE
THE DYNAMIC CYCLE OF LEGAL CHANGE
Professor John Martinez'
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience....
The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries,
and it cannot be dealt with as if
axioms and corollaries
of a book of mathematics.2
it contained only the
I Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of
Utah. This article was funded in part by the University of Utah
College of Law Excellence in Teaching and Research Fund. I would
like to thank my wife, Karen Martinez, for her encouragement and
support in the writing of this article.
2 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881).
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Introduction
Justice Holmes's observation that the law is a
product of empirical experience, not a problem of
mathematics, leaves us with the task of figuring out how
the legal system actually works. Although Holmes made
his statement over 130 years ago, there is still no
universally accepted analytical approach for describing
how the American legal system creates and changes the
law. This article proposes a "Dynamic Cycle of Legal
Change" as a model for understanding the structure and
operation of the American legal system.
Part I first posits that we should consider the legal
system from an "information systems" perspective. Part II
then describes the proposed "Dynamic Cycle of Legal
Change" (DCLC) as an information system model of the
legal system. Part III illustrates the operation of the DCLC
in three settings: common law, legislation, and direct
democracy. Illustrations include settings of gender
equality, fame as a property asset, palimony claims, crime
victims' bills of rights, same-sex marriage statutes, solar
acts, and the California coastal protection initiative and
subsequent statute.
I. An Information Systems Approach to the
American Legal System
Systems theory conceives of modern societies as
comprised of systems of communication for processing
information. 3 Examples of such systems include private
3 Benjamin J. Richardson, Financing Environmental Change: A New
Role for Canadian Environmental Law, 49 McGILL L.J. 145, 170
(2004). See generally NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM
(Klaus A. Ziegert trans., Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David Schiff
& Rosamund Ziegert eds., 2009).
3
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entities - such as corporations or partnerships - and
public entities - such as cities or state highway
departments.
Information systems engage in dynamic, continuous
processes of inputs, reactions, and feedback.4 A
corporation, for example, obtains inputs of information
regarding how its products or services are received by the
market, reacts to that information by adjusting its
production or marketing, and then repeats the cycle.
Similarly, a city obtains inputs of information regarding its
operations from the citizenry, reacts to that information by
adjusting the manner in which it provides public services,
and then repeats the cycle.
Herbert Simon, in his path breaking work, The
Sciences of the Artificial, emphasized that the structure and
operation of society's information systems is the result of
human design.5  Thus, he suggested that we can design
information systems, or "artifacts," on a societal scale.6
Only until comparatively recently, however, has the
American legal system been viewed as an information
system.7 Henry Smith has studied specific fields of law -
such as contract, tort, or intellectual property - using an
information systems approach. 8  Other scholars have
4 Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the
Constitution is a "Suicide Pact," 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287,
332 n.244 (2011); see also FREDERICK L. BATES, SOCIOPOLITICAL
ECOLOGY: HUMAN SYSTEMS AND ECOLOGICAL FIELDS 80 (1997).
5 HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 111 (3rd ed.
1996) ("Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at
changing existing situations into preferred ones.").
6 Id. at 141.
7 See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a
Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 727, 739
(1989) ("The law autonomously processes information, creates worlds
of meaning, sets goals and purposes, produces reality constructions,
and defines normative expectations . . ).
8 Particularly significant in this regard is Henry Smith's work: Henry
E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691
4
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applied variants of complex adaptive systems theory -
such as game theory and chaos theory - to the study of the
legal system, but such efforts have foundered on the shoals
of indeterminacy that such variants produce.9
There is no universally accepted analytical approach
for describing how the American legal system creates and
changes law.' 0 Systems theory can inform understanding
of the American legal system, but we need a model for
understanding its structure and operation." This article
proposes a "Dynamic Cycle of Legal Change" as such a
model.
(2012); Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts,
4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in
Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083 (2009); Henry E. Smith,
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1175 (2006).
9 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 885 (2008). On the problems of indeterminacy, which such
variants produce, see Jeffrey D. Rudd, JB. Ruhl's A Law and Society
System: Burying Norms and Democracy under Complexity Theory's
Foundation, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 551 (2005)
(critically analyzing J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: Wake-Up Call for Legal
Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849,
861 (1996), which concludes that "[Y]ou can't ever reach absolute
system predictability for a nonlinear dynamical system. . . . [Just]
blame it on chaos, emergence, and catastrophe.").
1o See generally David T. Richie, Using John Dewey's Pragmatism
Epistemology to Teach Legal Analysis and Communication, 5 CRIT:
CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J. 1 (2012) (discussing various approaches for
describing the American legal system).
" Niklas Luhmann suggested that the legal system could be understood
by examining its underlying structure, but he did not formulate an
explanation of how the legal system actually works. NIKLAS
LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 140 (Klaus A. Ziegert trans.,
Fatima Kastner et al. eds. (1993) (2004)) ("This does not mean, as one,
might suspect at first glance, that the legal system and the political
system form one system together. But they do resort to special forms
of structural coupling and are linked to each other through that
coupling.").
5
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II. The American Legal System as a "Dynamic
Cycle of Legal Change"
A. Creation of Law
The following diagram depicts the "Dynamic Cycle
of Legal Change."l 2
Courts/Legislatures/Populace
Legal Doctrine/Rules of Law (Means) Social Values/Norms (Ends)
Social Reality
The DCLC is a graphic representation' 3 of how the
legal system makes and remakes the law over time. It is
composed of four major interrelated structures: (1) the
Institutions of Law Creation and Change, in the form of
courts, 14 legislatures,'" and the populace' 6 acting through
12 I have set out a slightly modified version of this diagram, which is
included in DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY LAW 9 (Lexis-Nexis 2011).
13 Graphic representations illustrate the operation of dynamic systems.
These representations serve to explain the acquisition, processing, and
use of information to achieve meaning. See generally Jay M. Feinman,
The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989);
Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); John
Martinez, A Cognitive Science Approach to Teaching Property Rights
in Body Parts, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 290 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Missing
Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1989).
See also Timothy P. Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of
Legal Reasoning and the Development of Fundamental Normative
Principles, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 288 (1984) (application of cognitive
principles to explain legal reasoning by means of graphic
representations, such as lines, planes, and cubes).
14 Courts "make" law. The now outdated "declaratory" or
"Blackstonian" theory of judicial decision making posits that courts
merely "fmd" the law rather than "make" it. For discussions of the
declaratory theory, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-29
6
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(1964); Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65
(1932); J. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 218-27 (1921). In
contrast, the modern Legal Realist position is that courts indeed "make"
law. See Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2, 6 (1960) (judges as much as legislators exercise an
ineluctable law-creating function). See generally Gilmore, Legal
Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); BENJAMIN
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
In an earlier article, I suggested that both approaches can be
mapped onto an analytical framework that considers judicial decision
making as involving three decisions: (1) the substantive decision to
change the law; (2) the temporal decision to identify the transactions to
which the change applies; and (3) the remedial decision to determine
whether a remedy should be provided to those who have reasonably
relied on the prior law to their detriment. See John Martinez, Taking
Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to be Free from
"Startling" State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 297,
299-300 (1988).
Both theories therefore entail the threshold decision whether
to change the substantive law. The difference comes in the second,
temporal, decision identifying the transactions to which the change will
apply and in the third, remedial, decision whether to provide a remedy
to those who reasonably relied on the prior law. Under the
"declaratory" theory, all substantive changes are by definition
retroactive, since the change in the law already "existed." And since it
therefore was not a "change" at all, because everyone is presumed to
know the law, no remedy is required.
In contrast, as set out in my earlier article, the Legal Realist
conception that courts indeed "make" law requires serious
consideration of the second two decisions. See John Martinez, Taking
Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to be Free from
"Startling" State Court Overrulings, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 297,
346 (1988) (suggesting that either compensation, or a reasonable period
of time to amortize their investments, should be provided to those who
reasonably rely on common law property rules that are subsequently
overruled by state courts).
15 "Legislatures" includes Congress at the federal level, state
legislatures, and local government legislative bodies, such as city
councils.
16 There is no national "power of initiative." The only way for the
general public to impose a rational legislating requirement on Congress
would be through the cumbersome constitutional amendment process.
David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide: An Assessment of the
7
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initiatives or referenda;17 (2) Social Reality, as perceived by
the institutions of legal change; (3) Social Values (or
"Norms "), inferred as "should" statements, from social
reality as perceived by the institutions of legal creation and
change; and (4) Legal Doctrine (or "rules of law"),
whereby the institutions of legal creation and change seek
to implement the derived social values or norms.
The components and operation of the DCLC
confirm that "every legal decision is a moral decision."' 8
Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 42 (1995)
("The United States is one of only five democracies which has never
held a national referendum . . . ."). However, about half the states do
have the initiative mechanism in place whereby citizens may enact
statutory or constitutional amendments through popular vote. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power of this State is vested
in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and
Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative
and referendum."); OR. CONST. art. IV, § I ("The legislative power of
the state, except for the initiative and referendum powers reserved to
the people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly, consisting of a Senate
and a House of Representatives."). David B. Magleby, Let the Voters
Decide: An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 13, 15 (1995) ("Only six states west of the Mississippi
River do not have some form of initiative . . . while only eight states
east of the Mississippi have the process."). See generally K.K.
DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternate
Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185
(1995) (discussing history of initiatives).
1 Executives, such as the President, governors, and mayors also
"make" law but usually through authority delegated by legislative
bodies. When they do have independent authority to make law, the
mechanism and constraints applicable to legislatures, the other elected
institutions of legal change, apply to executives as well. Accordingly,
executives are not treated as separate institutions of legal change in the
DCLC.
18 My good friend and mentor, John J. Flynn, late Hugh B. Brown
Professor at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah,
used to tell me this all the time. This article is the fruition of my
understanding of that phrase and is dedicated to his memory.
8
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The entire DCLC is a design of the legal system. The
institutions of law creation and change (courts, legislatures,
or the people acting through direct democracy in the form
of initiatives and referenda) comprise the "modules" or
"subsystems," which are the engines of the DCLC.19
Social Reality is the object "data" used by the institutions
of law creation and change. The Norms derived from
social reality and the Legal Doctrine to implement those
norms are the "output" of the institutions of legal change.20
The operation of the DCLC consists of a dynamic
process: From a perceived social reality, social values or
norms ("should" statements) are inferred by the institutions
of law creation and change. 21 Those institutions then
transform the inferred "should" into enforceable legal
doctrine, which is then applied to society.22 Legal doctrine
is thus the means whereby social values or norms, as ends,
Cf Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas
Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1652 (1989) ("The norm is the
application of the norm. It is not prior to application.").
19 HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 184 (3rd ed.
1996) (noting that systems may be composed of interrelated
subsystems - which in turn may be composed of sub-subsystems and
so on - "until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem").
20 Id. at 146-47 (society is the "data" used by institutions in the legal
system).
21 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an
Iterative Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2006). See also Guido
Westkamp, Code, Copying, Competition: The Subversive Force of
Para-copyright and the Need for an Unfair Competition Based
Reassessment of DRM Laws after INFOPAQ, 58 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y
U.S.A. 665, 724-25 (2011) ("Normativity depends on recognizing
structural changes between the legal and social sub-systems to which
the law is to apply . . .").
22 See Thomas 0. Beebee, Can Law-and-Humanities Survive Systems
Theory?, 22 L. & LITERATURE 244, 263 (2010) (describing this process
as "formalization," which can also be termed "channeling" or
"translation," whereby legal institutions elicit norms from social reality
and "formalize," "channel," or "translate" such norms into legal
doctrine).
9
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are implemented.23 The cycle then begins again: The
institutions of legal creation and change use the feedback
from social reality to infer new norms ("should") and/or to
modify legal doctrine.24
B. Change of Law
The operation of the DCLC shows how a change of
law may occur at the level of legal doctrine or, more
fundamentally, at the level of social values or norms.
1. Change in Legal Doctrine
Legal doctrine is adjusted from time to time to
ensure that the "fit" between the inferred social values or
norms and their implementation is appropriately "close."
In this form of legal change, the social values or norms are
23 Gunther Teubner similarly describes the operation of the legal
system as a "hypercycle": "Law . .. distinguishes itself from society . .
. by constituting components in a self-referential way and linking them
together in a hypercycle." GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN
AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 25 (Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans.,
Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993).
24 This has been described as a "positive institutional feedback loop."
Daria Roithmayr, Them That Has, Gets, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 373, 376-
77 (2008). See also Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor:
Why the Constitution is a "Suicide Pact," 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 287, 332 n.244 (2011):
A "system" that promotes interplay or interaction is
always ongoing and active, never static or inert. A
system is a dynamic, continuous process of actions
and reflection based on inputs, reactions and
feedback to assess the inputs and reactions which, in
turn, inspire successive sets of inputs, reactions and
feedback. Under systems theory, unlike pure
structural-functional analysis, things and events,
because they move in time, cannot be understood
simply by scrutinizing them at any given moment.
10
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not questioned, but the efficacy with which the legal
doctrine implements those social values or norms is
examined and, if necessary, modified.
For example, in examining social reality, a
legislature may find that vehicle manufacturers have
installed additional or more effective safety devices.
Accordingly, the legislature may increase speed limits
because vehicles have become safer. The underlying norm
that people should be protected from driving faster than is
safe remains the same.25
2. Change in Social Values or Norms
More fundamentally, legal doctrine may be adjusted
because the underlying social norms or values derived from
social reality have changed. In this form of legal change,
when social reality changes - or at least when the
institutions of legal creation and change perceive that
reality has changed significantly - the social norms or
values inferred by the institutions may be modified as
well.26
For example, in examining social reality, Congress
and the state legislatures perceived that society had
changed such that human beings should not be owned as
25 Of course, competing norms, such as environmental protection from
vehicle pollution or fuel conservation, may make increasing the speed
limit inadvisable.
26 Niklas Luhmann describes this as the "temporalization of the validity
of norms." NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 469 (Klaus
A. Ziegert trans., Fatima Kastner et al. eds., 2009) ("Norms, and the
validity that supports them, are no longer based on the constants of
religion or nature or an unchallenged social structure, but are now
experienced and dealt with as time projections. They are valid 'until
further notice'. This not only makes them felt as contingent but also as
cognitively sensitized. . . . What is meant is only that norms are
equipped with assumptions of reality . . .").
11
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objects of property rights and implemented that norm
through the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.27
III. Illustrations of the Operation of the
Dynamic Cycle of Legal Change
A. Common Law - Courts as Institutions of
Legal Change
1. Gender Equality
In Kirchberg v. Feenstra,28 the United States
Supreme Court held that a mortgage on the home of a
married couple, signed only by the husband without the
notice or consent of the wife, violated the federal Equal
Protection Clause. The mortgagee had obtained the
mortgage pursuant to the Louisiana "Head and Master"
statute, which authorized the husband to alienate the
property of the marriage without his wife's prior notice or
consent. 29
In terms of the DCLC, Social Reality prior to the
Court's decision viewed women as incapable of managing
their own property once married. 30 The Norm (or "should"
27 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction."). That change, of course, occurred
only after the trauma of the Civil War.
28 Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
29 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (West 1971). The statute was repealed
effective on January 1, 1980. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2325-76
(West 1979). The Feenstra mortgage had been signed in 1974.
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 457 (1981).
30 For a discussion of the Napoleonic Code and Spanish law as the
sources of the Head and Master statute, see Louis F. Del Duca & Alain
A. Levasseur, Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplants on the
Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 25-29
(2010). Married women "owned" equally with their husbands, but only
12
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statement) from that perceived reality was that a man
should be the "head and master" insofar as property of the
marriage was concerned. The Louisiana Legislature, as the
instrument of implementation of that Norm, enacted the
Head and Master statute, which embodied the following
Legal Doctrine: If a husband signs a mortgage on marital
property without the notice or consent of the wife, such
mortgage is enforceable.
Mrs. Feenstra got the Court to acknowledge the
existence of a different Social Reality: Married women can
manage their own property affairs. The Court derived a
new social norm: Women should have an equal voice in
how marital property is alienated. Accordingly, as the
instrument of legal change, the Court modified the Legal
Doctrine: If a husband signs a mortgage on marital
property without the notice or consent of the wife, such
mortgage is not enforceable.
2. Fame
In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 3 1 the court held that fame was protectable as a
property asset called the "right of publicity." 32 Thus, the
court held, a first transferee of the right of publicity of
the husband was empowered to act in regard to assets of the marriage.
Nina Nichols Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803:
Sociedad De Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1969) ("Whereas the
wife owned equally with her husband, he, as "business manager," of
the partnership, actually administered the community of gains.... He
was described as 'in actu' (in control) as well as 'in habitu' (in present
interest). The wife was only 'in habitu' or 'in habitu et in creditu' (in
present interest as creditor) in regard to the bienes gananciales, but no
less a co-owner.").
31 Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953).
32 Id. at 868. See generally STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY-
THE HISTORY OF How, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 130-61 (2011)
(discussing the evolution of "owning fame").
13
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certain baseball players could enforce such right against a
subsequent transferee. 33
In terms of the DCLC, Social Reality prior to the
court's decision did not acknowledge "fame" as a proper
object of property rights. The Norm (or "should"
statement) from that perceived reality was that people
should not be able to exercise any of the sticks in the
bundle of rights - transfer, use, or exclusion - against
others in regard to fame. Previous courts had not
conceived of such a property right. Thus, the operative
legal doctrine was as follows: If a person contracts to
allow another to use his or her photographs, and also
subsequently contracts with a third party to also use his or
her photographs, then the first contracting party has no
claim against the third party.34
The first contracting party in the Haelan case got
the court to acknowledge the existence of a different Social
Reality: Fame has pecuniary value.35 The court derived a
new social norm: People should be able to treat their
"fame" as an object of property rights.36 Thus, the
13 Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 869
(2d Cir. 1953).
34 Indeed, that is what the defendants in the Haelan case asserted. Id. at
868.
3 For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements and popularizing their countenances, as displayed in
newspapers, magazines, buses, trains, and subways. This right of
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be made
the subject of an exclusive grant that barred any other advertiser from
using their pictures. Id. at 868.
36 But plaintiff, in its capacity as exclusive grantee of player's right of
publicity, has a valid claim against defendant if defendant used that
player's photograph during the term of plaintiffs grant and with
knowledge of it. It is no defense to such a claim that defendant is the
assignee of a subsequent contract between that player and Russell,
purporting to make a grant to Russell or its assignees. For the prior
14
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operative legal doctrine became as follows: If a person
contracts to allow another to use his or her photographs,
and also subsequently contracts with a third party to also
use his or her photographs, then the first contracting party
has a property claim against the third party.
3. Palimony
In Marvin v. Marvin,37 the California Supreme
Court held that unmarried cohabitants could enforce rights
against each other as to assets acquired during the duration
of the cohabitation.
In terms of the DCLC, Social Reality prior to the
court's decision refused to acknowledge the existence of
unmarried cohabitation. The Norm (or "should" statement)
from that perceived reality was that people should not
cohabit other than in the status of marriage. The courts, as
the instruments of implementation of that Norm, followed
the Legal Doctrine that, if property had been acquired only
in the name of one of the parties to such relationships
(typically the man in a heterosexual relationship), then all
such property belonged to that party. 38
grant to plaintiff renders that subsequent grant invalid during the period
of the grant (including an exercised option) to plaintiff but not
thereafter. Id. at 869.
n Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (1976).
38 This was the ruling of the lower court in Marvin v. Marvin:
In the instant case plaintiff and defendant lived
together for seven years without marrying; all
property acquired during this period was taken in
defendant's name. When plaintiff sued to enforce a
contract under which she was entitled to half the
property and to support payments, the trial court
granted judgment on the pleadings for defendant,
thus leaving him with all property accumulated by
the couple during their relationship.
Id. at 110.
15
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Michelle Marvin persuaded the California Supreme
Court to acknowledge the existence of a different Social
Reality: "The 1970 census figures indicate that today
perhaps eight times as many couples are living together
without being married as cohabited ten years ago." 39 The
court derived a new social norm: "The courts should
enforce express contracts between non-marital partners
except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded
on the consideration of meretricious sexual services."40
Accordingly, as the instrument of legal change, the court
modified the Legal Doctrine:
In the absence of an express contract, the
courts should inquire into the conduct of the
parties to determine whether that conduct
demonstrates an implied contract, agreement
of partnership or joint venture, or some other
tacit understanding between the parties. The
courts may also employ the doctrine of
quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such
as constructive or resulting trusts, when
warranted by the facts of the case.4'
B. Legislation - Legislatures as Institutions of
Legal Change
1. Crime Victims' Bills of Rights
In 1994 the Utah Legislature proposed for
adoption 42 what subsequently became the Victims' Rights
39 Id. at 110 n.1.
40 Id. at 110.
41 Id.
42 S.J. Res. 6, 1994 Utah Laws 1610, 1610-11.
16
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Amendment to the state constitution. 43 The Amendment
and the subsequent implementing legislation gave crime
victims numerous substantive and procedural rights that
they did not have before, including the right to be informed
of, be present at, and be heard at important criminal justice
proceedings and to have the judge consider victims'
statements as relevant information in sentencing."
In terms of the DCLC, Social Reality prior to the
Amendment did not view crime victims as proper
participants in criminal justice proceedings involving the
crimes committed against them. The derived Norm was
that crime victims should not be allowed to participate in
criminal proceedings. Legislatures and common law
courts, as the instruments of implementation of that Norm,
followed criminal procedure rules that excluded evidence
from such crime victims as well.
My colleague, Professor Paul Cassel, was extremely
instrumental in getting the Utah Legislature to
acknowledge a different Social Reality: Victims of crime
are deeply affected and are often anxious to participate in
subsequent criminal proceedings involving defendants
charged with the crimes against them. The new derived
Norm became as follows: A crime victim should have a
right to participate in criminal proceedings involving
his/her victimization. Accordingly, both the Utah
43 Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and
the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
1373. Professor Cassell was also instrumental in the subsequent
enactment of The Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA") in 2004. Pub.
L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-65 (2004) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006)). Paul G. Cassell & Steven
Joffee, The Crime Victim's Expanding Role in a System of Public
Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims' Rights
Act, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164 (2011).
4 Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and
the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
1373, 1386-1416.
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Legislature and the populace enacted a new legal doctrine:
A crime victim has the right to offer evidence in subsequent
criminal proceedings involving his/her victimization.
2. Same-Sex Marriage Statutes
Same-sex marriage statutes are increasingly
proliferating across the United States.45 In terms of the
DCLC, Social Reality prior to the statutes viewed the status
of marriage as reserved for couples comprised of a man and
a woman. The derived Norm was that same-sex couples
should not be able to marry. Accordingly, marriage
licenses were issued only to heterosexual couples.
The gay and lesbian community and their
supporters, in an ongoing struggle, have been able to
convince state legislatures to acknowledge a different
Social Reality: Same-sex couples are "couples" in the
same sense as heterosexual couples. The newly derived
Norm, still in the process of development, is that same-sex
couples should be able to acquire the status of marriage.
Thus, at least some states have enacted a new legal
doctrine: Marriage licenses may be issued to same-sex
couples.
3. Solar Acts
The rejection of the "right to light" doctrine at
common law meant that landowners with solar collectors
could not prevent their neighbors from shading the
collectors.46 In terms of the DCLC, this reflected a Social
45 See generally Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the
Future of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 913 (2011);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex
Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471 (2012).
46 See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982) (discussing evolution of
"right to light" doctrine at common law).
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Reality whereby access to sunlight was viewed as merely
for aesthetic purposes. The derived Norm was that solar
collectors, whether in the form of trees, swimming pools, or
solar arrays, should not be allowed to prevent development
of adjacent lands. Thus, landowners could develop their
land regardless whether such development shaded adjacent
parcels.47
Environmentalists have persuaded state legislatures
to acknowledge a different Social Reality: Solar collectors
aid in reducing dependency on other forms of energy. 48
The newly derived Norm is that solar collectors -
variously defined among the different statutes - should be
protected against shading by neighboring landowners. 49
Solar acts embody a new legal doctrine: Landowners with
solar collectors have rights against neighboring landowners
who would shade the solar collectors.
C. Direct Democracy - The Populace as the
Institution of Legal Change
California voters passed Proposition 20 in 1972
because of concerns that cities and counties along
California's coastline were allowing overdevelopment of
coastal lands.50 The initiative measure enacted substantive
" See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.,
114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla.
1960) (hotel owner may shade adjacent hotel's swimming pool).
48 See generally Uma Outka, Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and
Regulatory Context, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1041 (2010).
49 For an analysis of the different definitions of solar collectors in solar
acts, see Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws
in a Different Light, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851 (2010). See generally
Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 881 (2009).
so Codified originally at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27000 as a temporary
measure and subsequently replaced by the Coastal Act of 1976, CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900. See Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the
Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private Economic Development, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 50-51 (2007) (popular concern about
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and procedural constraints on such development and
provided that those restrictions would be administered by a
state coastal commission and regional coastal
commissions.5 1
In terms of the DCLC, land use regulation along
California's coastline prior to the coastal initiative reflected
a Social Reality whereby city and county governments
were responsible for such regulation. The derived Norm
was that coastal landowners should only be concerned
about what such local governments demanded - or did not
demand - in regard to coastal land development. Thus,
the operative land-use regulation rules were contained only
in the land-use codes of the coastal cities and counties.
Environmentalists seeking to prevent
overdevelopment of coastal lands, as well as inland
residents who could not influence the land-use codes
enacted by coastal cities and counties, mobilized on a
statewide basis and passed the coastal initiative. The
initiative reflected a different Social Reality: Development
of the coastline was a concern not only of coastal
landowners and coastal cities and counties but of all of
California's population. The newly derived Norm was that
coastal landowners should be accountable to a statewide
agency, not just to local cities and counties. The initiative
thus enacted a new legal doctrine: Coastal landowners
became subject to the statewide initiative and the
regulations promulgated by the state coastal commission,
pursuant to the initiative and subsequent statute.
overdevelopment of the coast led to passing of California Coastal
Initiative).
1 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Reg'I Comm'n, 553
P.2d 546 (1976) (discussing coastal initiative and subsequent statute).
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Conclusion
The Dynamic Cycle of Legal Change primarily
seeks to describe how the legal system operates. It may
also have a prescriptive dimension if it helps understanding
of how the processes of legal creation and change should
work.52 However, I will leave that task for a future article.
52 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 138-39 (2009)
(descriptive norms merely purport to represent reality; prescriptive
norms seek to mandate that certain actions be performed).
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